202210261254 ⭐ preliminaries for an immanent hermeneutics

¶1. If a hermeneutics is to proceed immanently, it must account for the self-reflexivities already noted in the transcendental semiotic and the immanent semiotic. That is, preliminarily, the hermeneut must be clear about his subject-position before the object. However, whereas immanent semiotics states this as limit to the possibility of any immanent semiosis, immanent hermeneutics does not state this for immanent hermeneusis. Rather, immanent hermeneusis uses self-reflexivity as an opportunity for a declaration about the noumenal quality of the object, such that it had to appear in some such way because it appeared at some way at some time. Semiotics thereby leaves open the possibility of an appearance so new and unthinkable that it could not have been accounted for - treats of a solipsism of the present moment. Hermeneutics, by contrast, closes one portion of possibility, namely, historical possibility, because that history is the condition for its work. Semiotics, we might say, treats of time consciousness synchronously, whereas hermeneutics treats of it asynchronously or diachronically. Put another way, semiotics is a temporal slice of hermeneutics.

¶2. Because hermeneutics always investigates the condition for any appearance of an object severally in consciousness across time, reflexivity here is also necessarily derived. However, such reflexivity is (again) investigated only insofar as it can make a claim about the noumenality of the object to the subject. That is, though I must impute my hypothesis to the object, I do so on grounds of and not in spite of the fact of my subjective limitation. I impute the hypothesis de re because in order for me to persist as subject and it to persist as object it must at least be present to me according to the hypothesis. This is, transcendentally, the conclusion of any immanent hermeneutic argument. The truth hereof rests only on intersubjective consensus and the givenness of the object across those who convene thereon.

Introductory

¶3. Because the immanent semiotic proceeded at the heels of the transcendental semiotic, I found it necessary to give a nearly complete account thereof. However, for my purposes, the entirety of Gadamerian hermeneutics need not be worked out here. If one wishes to read them in their circular function, they may do so upon a search, or in the article linked in the references section to this piece [@farooqReviewGadamerianRicoeurian2018]. Instead, I will work out its moments in basic outline:

1. historico-culturally situated subject
2. implicatures of the history and culture of that subject
3. historico-culturally situated object
4. bona fide subject-object encounter
5. object implicatures rupture subject implicatures
6. horizons of implication across subject and object fuse

¶4. This basic outline is adapted from the above article, and its moments proceed according both to the prefatory remarks here and the general derivation of the possibility of transcendental hermeneutics. For, (1.) and (2.) amount to self-reflexivity and its necessary recognition and (3.) - (5.) amount to the derivation of the necessity of hermeneutics from time consciousness with the object. (6.) alone stands as a unique dictum for hermeneutic work and, as such, it seems at first glance to question the imputation of the finality of hermeneusis to the object. However, it is the task of self-reflection to redouble this imputation, so that it too becomes a further moment of re-penetration into the object via a new circulation of hermeneusis. This, follows implicitly from the remarks made in ¶6 of the transcendental hermeneutic - if time consciousness means that an object encounter always differs across time, then hermeneusis can only be complete with respect to some such encounter or encounters. Future encounters will always thereby require new hermeneusis. The imputation of the result of the hermeneusis to the object is thus always provisional as a matter of the implications of such remarks. As such, I have already admitted the fusion of horizons and its demand for perpetual circulation of hermeneusis implicitly.

Hermeneutics by Way of Metaphor

¶5. Because the work of hermeneutics proceeds almost entirely as a superstructural work in the “stratosphere,” so to speak, most individual methodological moves of interpretation must be semiotic. As said in the transcendental hermeneutic, hermeneutics aims at uncovering the character of an object. Tying these remarks together, hermeneutics itself might only be described in terms of the character of its work. That is, the coordination of several semiotic analyses together would be just thereby a hermeneutic analysis. How one does such a hermeneutics is best advanced, in my view, by way of three practical metaphors which alternately describe differing characters of coordinated semiosis, that is, differentially characterized forms of hermeneutics.

¶6. Indeed, because I have taken the imputation of hermeneutics’ conclusion to be the fusion of horizons, what I have outlined in the immanent semiotic as IS13-21 generally amounts to what might be called hermeneutics proper. For, here, I encounter the object self-consciously with presuppositions and fuse them with the object. The use one is liable to make of such presuppositions is, in part, the justification for their being presupposed, a fact implied by IS19-21. Of course, for semiotics, such presuppositions are looked at in the micro-context of one individual sign-reading. Here, several signs are read in tandem with each other. Thus, the simple work of close attention to before and after the appearance of any one sign appears too granular. As such, though such work may be presupposed, it need not be. In this respect, immanent hermeneutic work is, in my view, less rigorous and time consuming than that of semiotic work. Indeed, because of the fecundity of confirmation bias, what proceeds as a series of signs read in tandem might be called mere average, everyday cognition for the sake of the support of any such presupposition. Indeed, as Marx rightly points out, this is the work of ideology. As later critical theorists note, such work proceeds with ease for the reason just said - signs in tandem can everywhere be read with each other in favor of a presupposition. For this reason, in synthetic view, I list 3 practical methods of making use of this bias self-consciously (or as self-consciously as possible):

1. hermeneutic hypotheses (=lenses)
2. hermeneutic axes
3. hermeneutic grids

Hermeneutic Hypotheses

¶7. The hermeneutic hypothesis is only an abducted hypothesis relying on someone else’s abduction. As such, we can assume that some sort of semiotic work went into its creation - Marx did not generate his theory of capital in a vacuum, nor did Joachim de Fiore generate his theory of the 3 ages on an island. No, each thought with signs together into a coherent totality and rendered them as such. A hermeneutic hypothesis thus asks: if this hypothesis holds true, how would this object behave? We must, thus, state the hypothesis in all its technicality according to the literature we wish to cite. For the hypothesis to be considered as such, it must be a premise asserting some sort of mechanism, causal or correlative. This, then, is only an exploded version of IS13. After this, we proceed upon interrogation into the hypothesis, which proceeds as a series of quasi-immanent semiotic investigations. Thus, if for instance Foucault’s theory of governmentality is true, we should be on the look out in some text for implicatures concerning panoptical observation. We will, of course, find no shortage of these, for this is only confirmation bias doing its work. Generally speaking, then, hermeneutics by way of hypothesis proceeds in three parts:

1. stipulation of the hypothesis
2. selection and investigation into the object by signs
3. fusion of object with the hypothesis

Again, (3.) consists in a fusion of whole with whole, so the explanation via the hypothesis amounts to a reading of the character of the whole object vis-à-vis the sign-reading.

Hermeneutic Axes

¶8. To make the hypothetical work more robust, we might admit of more than one premise in the hypothesis. When we do so, however, we axiomatize the hypothesis and thereby create axes of meaning across the (at least two) premises. Proceeding with the example of Foucault’s governmentality, in addition to a single-premise expectation of panopticism, we might also say something about the increase or decrease of this with time (a part of Foucault’s general theory), or perhaps something about the application of governmentality to sexuality; or, perhaps, we could assert an interpretation in which all 3 are considered. Across these axes the hermeneut situates different signs, so that (e.g.) for governmentality a particular sign falls upon one end or another - the same is true for temporality and sexuality in this example. Of course, this also happens with the hermeneutic hypothesis. However, the spectral nature of hypothesis-confirmation in semiotic work is unhelpful so far as a description of the work goes. Such a description is helpful here, as the 2, 3, 4,…n dimensionality of the axes produces a second-order meaning of the situation of a given sign across intersecting dimensions of the hypothesis. The singular dimensionality of the single-premise hypothesis hereby makes its reliance on confirmation-bias abundant - with such generality, nearly everything can be read under its purview. With additional premises, the situation of signs in the hypothesis for an ultimate fusion becomes more narrow. Hereby, the hypothesis becomes more robust and the selection of signs more intensive. Hermeneutics by way of axes thus also proceeds in three parts:

1. stipulation of complex hypothesis
2. selection and situation of object signs
3. fusion of the object with the hypothesis

Hermeneutic Grids

¶9. If one asserts a sufficient amount of premises or, perhaps, requires paragraphs to assert their hypothesis, it makes more sense to abandon talk of axes and spectra in favor grids. Indeed, for hypotheses of at least 3 distinct premises, it begins to make more sense to speak of grids. Taking Freud’s postulation of id, ego, and superego as an example, supposing we have properly articulated each, we can set up a 3x3 grid of affirmations to denials, running id-ego-superego on the vertical axis and each of their negations on the horizontal axis. As more signs are fit upon the grid, gradually the whole of the object comes into view under that grid’s aspect. The utility of a hermeneutic grid, then, lies in its explanatory power for the phenomena (or signs) of the object (or noumenon) under investigation. Of course, the richer the vocabulary postulated, the greater will be the grid which affirms and denies them. Thus thereby will the object be more diffusively accounted for, so that grid enables manifold coordinations of signs, often the same signs, several times over.

¶10. There is a sense in which the grid is a glass through which we see darkly, a lens through which we concentrate beams of intentionality. Such concentration proceeds identically to that of the method of hermeneutic axes.

A Note on Syllogisms

¶11. In my statement of first premises, I have worked out a series of hermeneutic syllogisms relating individual objects to universals. Each syllogism shows the order of argumentation when conducting hermeneutics. Thus, though I will appeal generally to this document in the future for the principles of my immanent hermeneutics, future defensive and reconstructive work will proceed according to the syllogisms given there. That is, if I conduct a future hermeneutic in which several of my arguments are obscure, I will take it on myself to clarify them by appeal to the structures laid out there. Such structures may come back as I conduct my writing, so as to support the general tenor of my claims as I write. If this is the case, a document will be posted outlining the order and structure of said claims with respect to their hermeneutic significance.

A preliminary list of hermeneutic hypothesis:

1. Natural antagonism (Marx, Engels, Heraclitus, Lao Tzu, Huizinga)
2. Natural reincarnation (Pythagoras, Buddhism, early Judaism)
3. “Karma” / “Dharma”
4. Homeric subjection to fate / cosmic justice
5. Homeric hero’s journey
6. Sophiclean blinding to hubris
7. Platonic intellectual ascent
8. Platonic apopria
9. Platonic stages of the state
10. Platonic justice
11. Aristotelian virtuosity
12. Aristotelian logicism
13. Aristotelian catharsis
14. Aristotelian justice
15. Aristotelian logicism
16. Aquinas’s divisions of law
17. Aquinas’s formed faith
18. Judeo-Christian moral ascent, 2nd coming
19. Virgil’s ascent of Rome
20. Medieval great chain of being
21. Alchemical magnum opus
22. Thomistic 3 acts of mind
23. Rousseauian departure from nature
24. Hobbesian state of nature
25. Spencerian state-as-coercion
26. Emersonian-Romantic self-overcoming
27. Emersonian self-reliance
28. Transcendentalist re-unity with nature
29. Baconian materialism
30. Kantian self-clarificationism (the efficacy of critique)
31. Kant’s two stems
32. Kantian-Durkheimian moral perfectionism
33. Millian utilitarianism
34. Durkheimian labor differentiation/specialization
35. Durkheimian anomie
36. Weberian rationalization
37. Protestant work ethic
38. Hegelian absolute understanding
39. Hegelian inferentialism
40. Hegelian encyclopedism
41. Hegelian state-as-moral/rational-perfection
42. Hegelian recognition
43. Marxist communism
44. Marxist alienation
45. Marxist state-as-alienation
46. Marxist crisis theory
47. Marxist “iron law” of falling profit
48. Jamesian pragmatism about practices
49. Peircean pragmatism about concepts
50. Deweyan pragmatism about thinking/reflex-action/discovery
51. Mead’s pragmatism about significant symbols
52. Wittgenstein’s pragmatism about term meaning
53. Rortyan pragmatism about social usefulness
54. Comtean historical stages
55. Woolfian androgyny
56. Piagetian increasing cooperation
57. Baudrillardian detachment of signifiers
58. Baudrillardian signification structure
59. Derridean phallogocentrism
60. Benjamin/Debord’s intensification of spectacle
61. Thucydidean/Spenglerian decline
62. Foucaultian governmentality
63. Foucaultian panopticism
64. Foucaultian archealogy/genealogy
65. Foucaultian power (qua flow, “force on force”)
66. Foucaultian repression
67. Foucaultian technologies of the self (Pagan-Expressive, Christian-Mortifying)
68. Liberal-Whig “progress” in freedom
69. Neoliberal “progress” in material goods (as a progress in freedom)
70. Deweyan/Holmes/Kuhn complexification
71. Deweyan pragmatism about the state
72. Deweyan conflict theory
73. Deweyan public-occlusion / public-discovery
74. Modern fragmentation of social coherence
75. Postmodern balkanization of discourses
76. Metamodern reflection-into-subject
77. Fascist decline of masculinity
78. Fascist invasion of the Other
79. Racial self-enclosure narratives
80. Game-Theoretic advancement of self-interest
81. Evolutionary-adaptive filling of niches
82. Machiavellian motive-occlusion
83. Evolutionary-psychological offspring games
84. Pareto-Mills elite entrenchment
85. Adorno’s ideological entrenchment
86. Military-Industrial complex
87. Kaczynski ecological decline
88. Psychoanalytical cultural repression of desires
89. Patriarchy as universal subjection of women
90. Colonialism as wealth-extraction
91. Scientistic/Logical Positivist narratives of absolute discovery
92. Quietism (esp. social → Lao Tzu, Alan Watts, Buddhism, Wittgenstein)
93. Nietzschean master/slave moral ascendancy
94. Nietzschean personal moral constructivism
95. Nietzschean will to power
96. Rortyan gestalt switching (vocabulary alterations)
97. Neoconservative anti-intellectualism
98. Habermasian discourse ethics
99. American exceptionalism
100. Queering as “living otherwise”
101. Self-help/positive thinking narratives (“Law of Attraction”)
102. Hermeneutics of suspicion
103. Hermeneutics of faith
104. Veblen’s conspicuous consumption
105. Schopenhauerian Will
106. Freudian theories of (id, ego, superego), (consciousness, unconsciousness, preconsciousness), (libido, repression), dreams
107. Jungian theory of archetypes
108. Wittgensteinian language games
109. Adlerian Great Ideas
110. Empedoclean four elements
111. Medieval Liberal Arts
112. Lacanian discourses
113. Platonic soul structure
114. Platonic knowledge structure
115. Platonic transcendentals
116. Burkean rhetorical pentad
117. Kierkegaardian faith
118. Kierkegaardian paradoxes
119. Peircean sign trichotomies
120. Peircean complexification
121. Heideggarian Dasein
122. Buberian addresses
123. Gnostic dualism
124. Cartesian dualism
125. Spinozist monism
126. Shakespearean staging
127. Landian acceleration
128. Saussurean paradigm/syntagm
129. Burkean pentad (“symbolic action”)
130. Deleuzeian desiring-production / desiring-machines
131. Burnhamite managerialism
132. Millian power-elitism
133. Wittgenstinean self-care (“logic/ethics takes care of itself”)
134. Goffmanite performance, frontstage/backstage
135. Simmel’s social anonymity
136. Bergsonian creative evolution
137. Frege-Russelian logicism/logocentrism
138. Lotman’s center-periphy of signs
139. Beckerian rational choice
140. Adornian Culture Industry

For the premises with which I make the most general hypothetical use, please see [[ 04 UNASSAILABLE PREMISES#Indeterminate|here ]]

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